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Summary Paper deals with the modelling of the safety-related Fieldbus communication system, which has to guaranty 
Safety Integrity Level (SIL) according to standard IEC 61508.  There are methods of safety analysis for the closed safety 
Fieldbus transmission system summarized. The mainly part the modeling SW tool SHARPE describes. The realized models 
are based on Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) and Markov analysis. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Nowadays the number of vendors of the safety – 
related communication technologies who guarantee 
besides the standard communication, the 
communication among the safety – related 
equipment according to IEC 61508 [1] is increasing.  
Also the number of safety – related products is 
increasing, e. g. safety Fieldbus, safety PLC, safety 
curtains, safety laser scanners, safety buttons, safety 
relays and other. The buses with the communication 
profiles CIP Safety, ProfiSafe [2] are recommended 
for using in the safety – related systems with the 
safety integrity level 3 according to IEC 61508 or 
the category 4 according to EN 954-1. 
Modelling fulfils a very important task in process 
of analysis and synthesis of the safety – related 
communication systems within their lifetime. Within 
modelling the several parameters of system are 
controlled, which are the component part of the 
technical quality of a system. Between markers of 
the quality of systems belong: reliability, safety, 
lifetime, availability, no-failure operation, 
maintenance and assurance of maintenance [3]. 
Norm EN 50129 valid for interlocking systems [4] 
recommends to control within lifetime of system 
four parameters reliability, availability, 
maintainability and safety, signed as RAMS 
parameters. 
Choices of the suitable modelling method or 
technique depend on the type of Fieldbus system.  
Models are very often used in the process of 
structure design (production of new product) and 
also in the case of the setting of parameters after  
invasion to existing  communication system, e.g. 
reparation of system or addition of safety function to 
system for reason of increasing safety integrity level 
of system (SIL).   In order to achieve these tasks it is 
generally required to combine suitable modelling 
methods and tools on the base of the quantitative and 
the qualitative methods. The qualitative modelling 
method FTA (Failure/Fault Tree Analysis) is based 
on the deductive access (process from above to 
down) [3]. The goal of safety analysis on the based 
of fault tree is identification of failures types of 
system, which can cause the total failure of system. 
All reasons or the types of failures are determined 
for the top event or critical failure to next function 
level of the system. Accordance with [1] the 
quantitative method on the base of Markov analysis 
and Markov models is recommended for monitoring 
of RAMS parameters.  The promulgation of IEC 
standard 61508 has significantly re-vitalized Markov 
analysis by requiring the analysis of various 
disparate failure modes from a safety perspective. 
The methods also are receiving more attention 
because today‘s software tools make 
computationally complex Markov analyses easier to 
perform than in the past [9]. 
2. MODELLING OF FAILURE EFFECTS  
WITHIN SAFETY FIELDBUS SYSTEM  
Assume the digital industrial bus (Fieldbus) 
according to standard IEC 61158 [5]. Across this 
Fieldbus can communicate safety-non-related 
equipment (SNRE) as well as safety-related 
equipment (SRE). Analysis is focused just on the 
communications between the safety-related 
equipment (Fig. 1), which can fulfill the required 
safety integrity level (for safety industrial 
applications is sufficient the value SIL 3).    
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Fig.1  Communication between the safety-related 
equipment within the safety Fieldbus 
 
Analysis of the communication is done on the 
level of the end to end connection (Fig. 2).  The 
communication system consists of the safety-related 
equipments (SRE1, SRE2) and the trusted 
transmission system, which executes the safety-
related functions within transmission according to 
[6]. Beneath the trusted transmission system is 
untrusted transmission system, which ensures the 
transmission messages by the transmission code. To 
achieve the required safety level of transmission, the 
transmission messages have to be ensured by the 
safety code, which is located into safety–related 
communication layer (SCL). Encoder and decoder of 
the safety code have to be realized on the fail-safe 
principle. The component part of the transmission 
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system is the communication channel, which is 
influenced by electromagnetic interference only 
(EMI). The authors assume the closed transmission 
system and independence of encoders/decoders of 
the safety and transmission code. 
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Fig.2 Communication within closed transmission system 
 
The aim of the failure effects analysis on the 
safety is to form a model which allows to identify 
the transmission process of the system from a safety 
state (it may not be necessarily a failure a free state) 
to a dangerous state and permits to calculate 
probability of the dangerous state occurrence of the 
systems as a failure effect to a operating system. 
Fieldbus system normally does not work isolated 
but it is component part of another superior system 
for which it provides services. It means that initial 
point for safety evaluation model is to define the 
peripheries and borders of the transmission system 
and its superior control system with the aim to 
identify possible hazards of transmission system. 
Also it is necessary to define undesirable output 
events according to safety properties of the system. 
Undesirable events are usually undetected message 
integrity corruptions. Besides the analysis of safety 
functions it is necessary to make a quantitative 
evaluation of the undetected message rate of the 
transmission system according to [6]. 
The knowledge of faults attributes of the 
Fieldbus forms the basic assumptions related to the 
measures relation not only used to avoid failures but 
also for the fault detection and negation of the 
failure effects within their occurrence.  From this 
vision the considered faults in the transmission 
system Fieldbus can be divided to the following 
types: random failures of the transmission system 
Fieldbus HW; failures caused by EMI and 
systematic failures of the transmission system. 
The occurrence of a systematic failure is bonded 
to a concrete situation and a state of the Fieldbus 
transmission system. Mathematical modelling of this 
incidence is very problematic, because we have to 
know the type of distribution and its parameters. 
Faults caused by effect of interferences are 
represented mainly by disturbing of communication 
channel in consequence in electromagnetic 
interference (EMI). Frequency of corrupted 
messages depends on a disturbance value. Because 
of the fact that the Fieldbus transmission system has 
to dispose with the required value of a safety level 
also in case of an unexpected reduction of 
transmission  line quality, in practical determination 
we generally issue from a very pessimistic 
assumption (each of the messages in the output of 
the transmission is corrupted) [7].   
3. REALIZATION OF FTA AND MARKOV    
MODEL 
The safety analysis of communication via SW 
tool SHARPE is created for a closed Fieldbus 
communication system (without fixation to concrete 
type of the system and vendor). Assume the 
communication between two safety–related 
equipments (SRE1, SRE2) as it is shown Fig. 2. 
Component part of equipment SRE is encoder and 
decoder of safety code (safety code is located into 
safety communication layer).  Assume that 
communication system is ensured also by 
transmission code of untrusted transmission system 
too. The top event within a transmission system is 
corruption of message in input of the receiver of 
Fieldbus transmission system. Message can be 
corrupted by the following aspects: failures in 
transmitter part of Fieldbus communication system, 
failures in the transmission system (HW failures) 
and failure in communication channel (failures 
caused by EMI). 
The random failures of a decoder of the 
transmission code are the important part in the 
failure effects analysis for safety of the transmission 
system. The failure of the transmission code decoder 
can cause that all received messages are considered 
as correct. It is also necessary to take account a 
situation in which a decoder of the transmission 
code checks the received message but after that 
message can be corrupted during transmission from 
decoder of the transmission code to a decoder of the 
safety code. The fault tree, which can cause 
undesirable event, is   illustrated in Fig. 3.  
Top event (failure) in this model is “undetected 
corruption of message”. Under this event followed by 
“AND” gate are three other events. The first is “corruption 
of a message”, the second is “undetected error of the 
safety code” and the last one is “undetected error of the 
transmission code”. 
 SHARPE let users to define every event with 
optional distributions and their parameters. In this 
model are events defined by exponential distribution 
and the failure rate. Distributions like Weibull, 
distribution, Erlang distribution and others 
distributions are also available [8].  In the Tab.1 
descriptions of the events in the model are described. 
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Fig.3 FTA model of safety Fieldbus via SHARPE 
 
Tab.1 The root events of the FTA model 
Event Value Description 
Pemi 1.10-5 Effect of EMI 
lamHTP 1.10-4 
Failure of the transmitter part of the 
transmission system or the 
communication channel 
Pus 2-32 (2-16) Non sufficient detection ability of the safety code 
lamHDS 1.10-6 Failure of a decoder of the safety code 
Put 2-8 Non sufficient detection ability of the transmission code 
lamHDT 1.10-6 Failure of a decoder of the transmission code 
 
During the analysis users could select one or 
more outputs. Each modelling method in SHARPE 
has got its own outputs. Outputs of FTA are divided 
into two main parts: models with or without repeat 
events and models only with repeat events. In the 
first group are outputs like cumulative distribution 
function CDF, mean time to failure MTTF etc. If the 
function assigned to each component is the CDF of 
its failure time it gives the system failure time CDF. 
If the function assigned to each component is the 
instantaneous or steady-state availability it gives the 
instantaneous or steady-state system. Mean time to 
failure gives the mean of the exponential 
polynomial. In the second group are outputs such a 
minimal cuts. Output from the model could be also 
reliability (safety) graph. For instance graph from 
realized example of models with safety codes 
CRC16 and CRC32 are in the Fig. 4. Time values in 
the graph are in seconds. Unreliability for curve 2 
which describes the transmission with safety code 
CRC 32 is limiting the number 1 after 2.1010 s.  
The advantage of using non-state-space models 
(fault trees) is that they are efficient to specify and 
analyze.  
 
Fig.4 Reliability graph of the FTA model 
 
However, the analysis of these models assumes 
the components are independent. For instance fault-
tree components must be completely independent of 
one another in their failure and repair behavior. A 
failure in one component cannot affect the operation 
of another component, and components cannot share 
a repair facility. 
Nowadays, one of the most commonly used 
techniques for the modelling of gracefully 
degradable systems is the Markov model. Markov 
analysis looks at a sequence of event and analyzes 
the tendency of one event to be followed by another. 
Using this analysis, we can generate a new sequence 
of random but related events, which appear similar 
to the original.  
The Markov model assumes that the future is 
independent of the past given the present. When 
using Markov the random variable is indexed in 
time, which can be either discrete or continuous.
  
Fig. 5 Markov model of safety Fieldbus system via SHARPE 
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Markov model used for evaluation of safety of 
the Fieldbus transmission system between SRE1 and 
SRE2 created in a SW SHARPE is shown in Fig. 5.  
 
Tab. 2 Description of the diagram state 
State A description of the state 
1 The transmission system is functional; transmission message are corrupted by EMI 
2 
The transmission system state, when the 
transmitter part of the transmission system or 
some part of the communication channel are in 
failure 
3 The transmission system state, when the decoder 
of transmission code is in failure 
4 
The transmission system state, when the 
transmitter part of the transmission system or 
some part of the communication channel and the 
decoder of the transmission code are in failure. 
5 
Permanent interruption of transmission caused by 
a failure of mechanisms operation for checking 
of number of detected corrupted messages 
6 The hazard state corrupted message was 
undetected 
 
Tab. 3 The meaning of symbols 
Symbol The meaning of a symbol 
λHTP 
HW failure rate of the transmitter part of the 
transmission system and the communication 
channel 
λHDT 
HW failure rate of a decoder of the 
transmission code 
fEMI 
Frequency of the corrupted messages 
caused by EMI 
fW 
Frequency of the corrupted messages 
without the resolution of a corruption 
reason 
pUS 
Probability of an undetected error of the 
safety code 
pUT 
Probability of an undetected error of the 
transmission code 
σT 
Intensity of the transition to permanent 
safety state caused by a failure of 
mechanisms operation for checking a 
number by a decoder of the transmission 
code 
σS 
Intensity of the transition to permanent 
safety state caused by a failure of 
mechanisms operation for checking a 
number by a decoder of the safety code 
 
The system could be during a time in 6 states. 
Each of the states is defined in a Tab 2. System is at 
beginning of the simulation defined by initial 
probabilities. Probability to be in state 1 at the start 
is Pst(1) =1, it means that simulation always starts in 
the state 1. Transitions between states are shown in a 
Fig. 5 and meanings of the symbols are in the Tab 3. 
Markov model analysis in SHARPE has got also 
several possible outputs like cumulative distribution 
function CDF, steady state probability, state 
probability at the absorption, probability to be in the 
state at the defined time, mean time to failure etc. 
Users could also use a reliability/safety graph. 
Among most important outputs for this model 
belong CDF and absorbing state probability. Given 
state is called absorbing when it is impossible to 
leave it. There are two absorbing states in this model 
(state 6 and state 5). Hazard state where the 
corrupted message was undetected (dangerous state) 
is 6th state.  State 5 is a safety state of permanent 
interruption of transmission.  
4. CONCLUSION  
Markov models may be used to analyze smaller 
Fieldbus systems (as subsystem part of the total 
system) with strong dependencies requiring accurate 
evaluation. Then other analysis techniques, such as 
FTA, may be used to evaluate the total system using 
simpler probabilistic calculation techniques. Large 
systems, which exhibit strong component 
dependencies in isolated and critical parts of the 
system, may thus be analyzed using combination of 
Markov analysis and simpler quantitative models. 
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